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ABSTRACT
Large-scale irrigation schemes, which are often developed in ﬂood plains, overvalue technical expertise and the control of
natural hazards and are particularly vulnerable to ﬂooding, but there has been limited study on the impact of ﬂoods on irrigation
functioning. Using a transdisciplinary approach developed in the Chokwe Irrigation Scheme during the 2013 post-ﬂood recov-
ery period, we analysed the impact of ﬂooding on the scheme with a focus on maintenance. We argue that the ﬂood crisis
provided windows of opportunity to reconsider maintenance procedures by rethinking the relations and responsibilities
between actors in this large-scale irrigation scheme; but the robustness of the system can only be increased if the changes
strengthen the collective action capacity. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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RÉSUMÉ
Les périmètres irrigués de grande hydraulique qui survalorisent l’expertise technique et le contrôle des risques naturels
sont souvent développés dans des plaines d’inondation et donc sont particulièrement vulnérables aux inondations; mais
peu de travaux analysent l’impact des inondations sur leur fonctionnement. En s’appuyant sur une approche
transdisciplinaire mis en œuvre dans le périmètre irrigué de Chókwè au Mozambique immédiatement après l’inondation
de 2013, nous avons analysé l’impact de l’évènement sur le périmètre en s’intéressant tout particulièrement à la main-
tenance des infrastructures. Nous soutenons que l’inondation a permis de reconsidérer les procédures de maintenance
en réorganisant les relations et les responsabilités entre les acteurs de ce périmètre irrigué de grande hydraulique; mais
la robustesse du système ne pourra être améliorée que si ces changements conduisent à renforcer les capacités d’action
collective. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Because of the substantial investment required by their de-
sign, construction and maintenance, the ability of large-scale
irrigation schemes to maintain their performance in the long
term is a key policy issue. Their capacity to be adapted to a
changing environment irrespective of technological shifts,
macropolitical economic transformation or climatic change,
is crucial. Many such schemes have been developed in ﬂood
plains, where the increasing frequency and intensity of rain
events result in recurrent ﬂoods. While traditional liveli-
hoods of those living on ﬂood plains are adapted to this re-
current risk, the conventional model of large-scale irrigation,
which is highly hierarchical, overvalues technical expertise
and solutions for the control of natural hazards. Along with
other major natural disasters, ﬂoods can result in physical
damage to infrastructure, thus making the maintenance
strategy a key factor in scheme recovery.
For a long time, public institutions have been perceived
as the most adequate structures to manage large-scale
irrigation systems (Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Ertsen, 2009).
From this perspective, the maintenance of irrigation
systems is viewed as a set of technical and economic tasks
best performed by the centralized bureaucracy in charge of
management of the scheme (Murray-Rust et al., 2003).
Strong central management—initially associated with con-
trol over farmers and the landscape—developed mainte-
nance strategies that were designed to preserve and
re-establish the system in order to provide the services
expected (Ertsen, 2009). The choice of a given mainte-
nance strategy is dependent on the available budget and
the managers’ experience and knowledge of the infrastruc-
ture, as well as the technical frame of reference of the
technicians and managers (Passouant et al., 2009). The
chosen strategy directly impacts the hydraulic performance
and risk of failure of the system and consequently the
scheme’s long-term performance.
The policies of irrigation management transfer (IMT) that
have become widespread in recent decades strengthened the
role of new actors in the maintenance of large-scale public
irrigation schemes. With the ﬁnancial support of interna-
tional organizations, new responsibilities were assigned to
the private sector and water users’ associations (WUAs) in
the process of maintenance (Merrey and Cook, 2012). Al-
though in practice their effective involvement is variable, it
is now widely acknowledged that scheme performance
results from the interactions of a variety of actors, including
various types of farmers, their associations, and the private
sector, as well as heterogeneous agents and segments within
the irrigation bureaucracy (Suhardiman et al., 2014).
This new approach reinforces the social and political
issues of irrigated scheme management and heightens the
importance of considering the relationships between actors.
It highlights the need to consider collective action and
horizontal cooperation between actors rather than coerced
coordination based on hierarchical procedures (Davies
et al., 2004; Meinzen-Dick, 2007).
Consequently maintenance activities cannot be reduced to
a technical–economic set of tasks but must be understood as
negotiated practices resulting from the interactions between
various actors with different individual and professional
backgrounds and thus representations. According to Cleaver
and De Koning (2015), maintenance practices are thus as
much shaped by the technologies and formalized institutions
of the scheme, such as maintenance manuals or irrigation
regulations, as by existing social norms—social expecta-
tions that guide behaviour or the exercise of creative indi-
vidual agency or individual capacity to act independently.
Consequently, it is necessary to rethink maintenance prac-
tices in the environmental, social, political and economic
constraints and individual representations in which they
are embedded.
While there is a considerable literature on adaptation to
ﬂooding in urban or rural livelihoods, there have been few
studies of the impact of ﬂoods on the functioning of irriga-
tion, or on its capacity to recover its properties. Janssen
and Anderies (2007) deﬁne robustness as the ability of
social–technical systems such as irrigation schemes to
continue to meet performance objectives in the face of un-
certainty and shocks. Floods have often been acknowledged
as a major risk in irrigation systems and technical solutions
have been incorporated in their design to face this type of
hazard. But this design had generally only considered recur-
rent risks which raises the question of their adaptation to the
uncertainties of climate change: unlike risks, uncertainties
cannot be statistically characterized (Cardona, 2004; Dessai
and Hulme, 2004). Large-scale infrastructures are often
perceived as being structurally unable to change and inno-
vate due to lock-in and path dependence (Kay, 2005).
Indeed, physical infrastructure alone cannot ensure the
necessary ﬂexibility to adapt: the adaptation capacity of
socio-technological schemes lies more in the capacity of
actors and institutions to deal with uncertainty than in tech-
nology (Lam, 2006; Blackmore and Plant, 2008; Milman
and Short, 2008). It is now widely acknowledged that the
vulnerability of large hydraulic systems is less related to
the stability of its physical components (the infrastructure
and its design) than to the uncertainty related to the
functioning and interactions of its different subsystems
(operational, environmental, social political and economic
domains). This argues for considering these different
domains jointly in the analysis of responses of irrigation
schemes to a ﬂood crisis.
Using a transdisciplinary approach developed in the
Eau4food project (Froebrich et al., this issue), we analysed
the impacts of a ﬂood event on the functioning of the
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Chókwè Irrigation Scheme in Mozambique. This irrigation
scheme is regularly affected by ﬂood events and this paper
is focused on the recovery period following the ﬂood crisis
of January 2013. We drew on the points of view of irrigation
scheme managers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and public aid organizations and farmers to argue that the
ﬂood crisis could provide an opportunity to reconsider
maintenance procedures by rethinking the relationships
and responsibilities of the actors concerned, as long as the
changes introduced do not jeopardize their capacity for
collective action.
CONTEXT
The Chókwè irrigation scheme
The Chókwè Irrigation Scheme (CIS) was the ﬁrst irrigated
scheme developed in Mozambique and is still the largest
scheme in the country, but only 6849 ha were actually
irrigated in 2012/2013 due various problems including
salinization and the state of the infrastructure. In 2003 it
comprised 11 971 users of whom 79% had less than 2 ha,
while 64% of the area was farmed by large and commercial
farmers (above 10 ha) (Figure 1). Rice is the main crop dur-
ing the hot rainy season (October to April) and horticultural
crops during the cold dry season (May to September).
Ofﬁcial data from the scheme manager, HICEP (Hidráulica
de Chókwè, a public company), give an average rice yield
that evolved from 3.8 t ha1 (from 2002 to 2008) to 4.7 t
ha1 afterwards (2009 and 2010,) but surveys found an
average yield of 2.1 t ha1 (Kajisa and Payongayong,
2011) or 2.7 t ha1 (PROMPAC, 2011). There is no reliable
information on horticultural yields.
Following the development of an IMT policy sponsored
by donors, the Chókwè Irrigation Scheme governance was
reviewed in the mid 1990s (Box 1).
Box 1. Organization of the Chókwè Irrigation Scheme for
Operation and Maintenance
Operationally, the Chókwè Irrigation Scheme is divided
into three sectors: Montante (6000 ha), Sul (19 000 ha)
and do Rio (9000 ha). A main canal 14.3 km long brings
water from the Macaretane Dam on the Limpopo River
to 3 primary canals, which are themselves divided into
50 secondary canals. Secondary canals are divided into
suspended tertiary canals (called locally caleiras). There
are 11 primary drains (also called vala) which collect
water from secondary canals. Siltation of the canals
limits the ﬂow to 11 m3 s1 instead of the nominal 43
m3 s1, and drainage is made difﬁcult because many
secondary drains are heavily silted up and invaded by
vegetation (PROMPAC, 2011).
In the 1990s the water sector was reformed: ARA-
SUL, the water agency responsible for river basins in
southern Mozambique, is in charge of ﬂood forecasting
and operation of the Massingir and Macaretane dams.
HICEP, a public ﬁrm dependent on the Ministry of Agri-
culture, was put in charge of the management of the pri-
mary infrastructure of the scheme to secure the water
supply and distribution, and to collect and manage the
water fees. Farmers were organized into 36 water users’
associations (WUAs) in charge of the maintenance of the
secondary to quaternary infrastructure (irrigation and
drainage). The operational maintenance work in the pri-
mary network was the responsibility of private service
providers contracted by HICEP. To facilitate coordina-
tion between these actors, consultative participatory bod-
ies (Conselhos Paritários de Gestão or CPG) were
institutionalized in each operational zone with a mandate
to meet twice a year for maintenance planning and an-
nual balance of the work. HICEP’s annual budget not
considering rehabilitation was around US$ 19 millions
in 2013: around 35% of this sum was allocated mainte-
nance (not considering salaries of permanent staff)
(Rizzolio, 2014). Prior to 2008 the water fee was around
20 US$ ha1 per season but there is no information on
the recovery rate.
Mozambique is the third most exposed country to ex-
treme events on the African continent (Global Facility for
Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 2009). The area of the
Chókwè Irrigation Scheme, which lies in the inundation
plain of the Limpopo River (Figure 2), is particularly vulner-
able (Asante et al., 2009) due to the inﬂuence of a huge
Figure 1. Repartition of the different types of farmers in the Chókwè Irriga-
tion Scheme.
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palaeo-delta in the ﬂood dynamics (Spaliviero et al., 2014).
There was no discernible pattern of rain changes in the south
of Mozambique between 1960 and 2008 because of the high
interannual variability, but the proportion of total rainfall
that falls in heavy events is projected to increase during De-
cember to February in projections from all models and all
scenarios, by up to 18%. It is associated with a projection
of an increase of 25% in the level of peak ﬂoods and a small
increase in the frequency of ﬂoods in the Limpopo Basin
(van Logchem and Brito, 2009).
Mild or moderate ﬂoods1 occurred in half of the 32
years with available data between 1953 and 1994. Four se-
vere ﬂoods occurred during this period (Instituto Nacional
de Gestão das Calamidades, Universidade Eduardo
Mondlane, Famine Early Warning Systems Network, 2003)
and two more in 2000 and 2013. During the ﬂood which oc-
curred on 23 January 2013, the city of Chókwè (located in
the middle of the scheme), and a part of the scheme and
neighbouring districts were ﬂooded; the provincial capital,
Xai Xai, suffered the same fate a couple of days later. Al-
though the numbers remained limited compared to the 800
casualties of the 2000 event, the ﬂood left 24 people dead
over 2 days and an estimated 150 000 people displaced.
The ﬂood was described by residents as sudden and massive
but the population and technicians were better prepared and
forewarned than for the previous event (see supplementary
material Box 1 for a description of the ﬂood).
Method
Our analysis was based on the representations, behaviour,
relationships and actions of the actors in the scheme’s main-
tenance. For this purpose, we chose a qualitative, multi-actor
and participatory approach, combining focus group discus-
sions (FGDs), participatory mapping and semi-structured
interviews that took place shortly after the event, between
April and August 2013. Depending on the issue being
addressed, separate approaches were adopted with the
farmers, technicians and managers of the irrigation scheme
and local NGOs involved in post-ﬂood recovery aid
(Table I). The participatory ﬂood mapping used, as a discus-
sion basis, the georeferenced maps of each hydraulic sector
maintained by HICEP with the infrastructure baseline
(primary and secondary infrastructure, roads, etc.). The
qualitative data gathered during the participatory mapping
exercises were completed with some quantitative data
provided afterwards by HICEP staff.
We focused our approach on the relaunch of agricultural
activities after the ﬂood. This paper does not address the
operational management of the ﬂood on the perimeter or in
Figure 2. Localization of the Chókwè Irrigation Scheme (adapted from Instituto Nacional de Gestão das Calamidades, 2003).
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the watershed, the emergency evacuation procedures or the
disaster relief operations, although some questions were
asked on these procedures to understand how they impacted
on individuals as farmers. We worked with the three associ-
ations involved in the Eau4Food project and presented in
greater detail in the introductory paper.
One person was in charge of the work concerning the
participatory mapping. Seven days of work in total were
necessary to map the ﬂood dynamic and damage: 3 days
of preparation, a 1.5 days for the three workshops in the
three hydraulic sectors and 3.5 days to digitalize the infor-
mation in the HICEP computerized georeferenced database
of the scheme. Another facilitator was in charge of the inter-
action with farmers ‘associations and organizations which
developed over a 2-month period. Each FGD lasted 2–3 h
and was attended by between ﬁve and eight farmers.
Associations and community leaders were interviewed
independently before the FGD.
RESULTS
The physical impacts of the ﬂood in the scheme
Mapping the ﬂood. The ﬂood map (Figure 3) clariﬁed
the participants’ perception concerning: (i) inundated areas
in the scheme; (ii) water ﬂow pathways in the scheme;
(iii) main infrastructure damage; (iv) areas where water
accumulated and drained with difﬁculty after the ﬂood;
(v) emergency repairs to secure minimal water distribution
when possible; (vi) emergency interventions before and
during the ﬂood to avoid major damage.
They discussed notably the role of the dam and dykes in
the protection of the schemes compared to past experience,
and the importance of the damage considered as massive
by HICEP: 70% of the irrigated crops were lost (approxi-
mately 3000 ha). HICEP estimated that there were 18 km
of damage along the hydraulic network (39% in the main ca-
nal, 6% in the primary and 21% along the secondary canals),
including an area that had just been rehabilitated.
In the design of the scheme, different mechanisms were
used to limit ﬂood impact in the scheme: two dams were
planned (Massingir Dam on the Elephant River completed
in 1981 and the Mapai Dam on the Limpopo Branch which
was never built), and a series of dykes isolated the scheme
from the river. In 2013 the dam faced maintenance problems
which limited its ﬂood retention capacity.
The map and discussions highlighted that the primary ﬂow
did not surge from the Limpopo River or dyke leakage as ex-
pected but from the north-western part of the scheme as the old
waterways of the Elephant River were reactivated (Spaliviero
et al., 2014). In a second phase dyke failure (through leakage
or local overtopping) accentuated the process. The canal sys-
tems and the sewage system of the city were both also instru-
mental in the transfer of ﬂowing water.
The reactivation of the old waterway of the Elephant
River in the critical location of the conﬂuence between the
Elephant and the Limpopo rivers is a recurrent risk. In
2012, ARA-SUL and HICEP successfully managed to avoid
ﬂooding in the city by diverting the ﬂow into a small area in
the northern part of the scheme. Small breaches in a dyke
were then created to divert the ﬂow back to the river down-
stream of the intake, but these breaches had not been
Table I. The research approach following groups of actors.
Group Approaches What was being investigated
Irrigation scheme
managers and
technicians
Participatory maps, workshops
and semi-directed interviews
with the main institutions (10)
Organization for infrastructure
management and emergency
interventions.
Flood model and ﬂood
management
Phase 1—Interviews with the representatives of the
main institutions concerning their ﬂood experience,
crisis management and damage
Phase 2—Workshop of half a day in each irrigation
sector with medium-scale technicians and some
association leaders (10/20 participants): ﬂood
experience, participatory mapping and possible
solutions; digitalization of the information gathered
in the georeferenced maps of HICEP
Phase 3—Presentation and discussion of
outcomes with high-level managers (2 workshops)
NGOs and public
aid organizations
Semi-directed interviews
(6 institutions and 6 NGOs)
Information about ﬂood crisis
management, perimeter design
and organization
The interview guidelines contain questions
concerning: (i) the rehabilitation of the scheme;
(ii) ﬂood management; (iii) support for irrigated
agriculture; (iv) local administration representatives
and local leaderships; and (v) NGOs involved in
post-ﬂood relief intervention
Farmers
(3 associations
studied)
FGDs and semi-directed
interviews
Perceptions of ﬂood alerts,
reaction and recovery strategy
and innovation
One focus group with each association
(8–15 farmers). Flood maps used as a stimulus for
discussion
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repaired in 2013 for lack of funding. As in the Rhône ﬂoods
in France (Picon and Allard, 2006), poor maintenance also
resulted from confusion concerning the responsibilities and
ownership of a dyke system that plays a dual or triple role
(river dyke/canal dyke/road) for the institutions in charge
of the road, irrigation and watershed infrastructure (Kuijpers
et al., 2013). This type of confusion can be traced to difﬁcul-
ties in comprehensively assessing the practical implication
of the reforms of water governance initiated in the mid
1990s in many countries, including Mozambique.
The mapping exercise also underlined the role of irriga-
tion and drainage canals in the water ﬂow. This was notably
the case of drainage canal V, which had been cleaned just
before the ﬂood and proved to be inﬂuential in the drainage
of the area and city. Certain areas of the scheme were
more vulnerable to the consequences of ﬂooding due to
their relative proximity to the water’s path. The socio-
organizational capacity of actors also impacted the extent
of local damage. The village of Chilembene, for example,
was relatively protected thanks to an initiative of the
villagers to break through a canal in order to facilitate
drainage. In coordination with the scheme manager, this task
was completed after the peak ﬂood by the ﬁrm in charge of
the rehabilitation to accelerate drainage of the area.
Scheme management at the time of the ﬂood was a source
of debate during the mapping exercise. Apparently, the ca-
nal gates were closed in an effort to slow down the ﬂooding
of the city of Chókwè (and thus facilitate evacuation) and
protect the scheme. But as the water came in unexpected
volumes, the ﬂood was uncontrollable and the closed gates
may have impeded drainage of the water, weakened some
of the infrastructure and facilitated inundation of crop areas.
Different types of damage. Table II recapitulates the
different types of damage identiﬁed during the mapping ex-
ercises. They concerned different aspects of the functioning
of the scheme (Table II). While some of the damage directly
impacted water distribution and/or drainage, other factors
had a longer-term impact. According to HICEP, damage
Figure 3. The ﬂood map.
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was estimated at US$19 million—not including the rehabil-
itation of the suspended tertiary channels.
The state of the scheme as a consequence of previous
ﬂooding in the context of irrigation reform
The vicious circle of irrigation schemes, which links low
payment rate of water fees, inadequate maintenance and
poor functioning of infrastructure, and which leads to the
dissatisfaction of water users and consequently fuels poor
payment rates, is an acknowledged reality of irrigation
systems (Inocencio et al., 2007). In the case of Chokwe
Irrigation Scheme this vicious circle is accentuated by the
frequency of ﬂoods which periodically impact plot leveling
and canal functionning. This not only exhaust the limited
maintenance budget of HICEP but also make rehabilitation
a risky investment which discourage donors or private
partners from investing in the scheme.
It was only in 1997—10 years after the creation of a
Project Implementation Unit to supervise the rehabilitation
of the Chókwè Irrigation Scheme—that a ﬁrst donor, the
French Development Agency, agreed to intervene by reha-
bilitating a pilot area of 1000 ha, along with restructuring
of the governance of the scheme. However, the work was
delayed because of the 2000 ﬂood: the French funding
was then used for post-ﬂood emergency repairs in the
scheme while the Japanese government funded the repair
of the main canal. Even after this rehabilitation the govern-
ment of Mozambique (GoM) experienced difﬁculty mobi-
lizing the traditional donors involved in irrigation
development, and the subsequent rehabilitation phases in-
volved unconventional donors such as OPEC (Organiza-
tion of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) and the
Islamic Development Bank.
Two private investors also funded rehabilitation of spe-
ciﬁc areas. Both were involved in direct production and
support to farmers. A British-owned company (Moçfer
Industrias Alimentares, MIA) took up irrigated rice produc-
tion in the CIS in order to make the rice processing facility it
had bought in 2005 proﬁtable (Veldwisch, 2015) through
direct farming of 500 ha and subcontracting 3500 ha to
farmers. More recently, HICEP was also discussing the
involvement of a private Chinese consortium (a private ﬁrm
and a bank) already intervening in another scheme in the
province to rehabilitate 10 000 ha. Yet, after 4 years of
unsatisfactory rice collection MIA decided to stop its
activities in the Chókwè Irrigation Scheme mid-2013, a
direct consequence of the US$4 million of damage its rice
stocks and processing facility suffered during the ﬂood.
The Chinese bank used the ﬂood vulnerability argument to
suspend its support to the consortium. The project is, how-
ever, expected to resume with the ﬁnancial support of the
Chinese government.
The rehabilitation projects led by the GoM (in contrast to
private-led projects) followed the initial design of the
Chókwè Irrigation Scheme up to the complex and fragile
aqueducts and tertiary canals. The repairs of the concrete-
suspended tertiary canals (caleiras) require a large work-
force and technical skills for levelling. Some aqueducts were
also systematically damaged by ﬂoods.
Private rehabilitation has generally been associated with
the levelling and transformation of the suspended canals
(caleiras) into compacted earth canals, to allow for large-
scale mechanized cropping systems. The Chinese consor-
tium also wanted to develop a deep drainage system.
MIA used ﬁve pivots that were destroyed during the 2013
ﬂoods. However, no information is available about the
rehabilitation and maintenance costs and requirements of
these different design options.
The ﬂood risk thus limited the willingness of investors
and donors to invest in the scheme, but the full implications
of the risk of ﬂoods were not really factored into the techni-
cal and institutional projects. For example, the ﬁrst rehabil-
itation involved the closure of some outlets that facilitated
the evacuation of water in the case of ﬂooding, while
making use of fragile elevated inlets.
The reform of maintenance governance inspired by IMT
policies and the normative view of the scheme’s
Table II. Main types of damage observed in the scheme.
Immediate impact on water
distribution
Immediate impact
on water drainage
Long-term impact
on water distribution
Long-term impact
on water drainage
• Damage to gates due to debris
• Gates bypass breaking canal banks
• Damage to complex canal
crossing (drainage × canal aqueduct)
• Destruction of tertiary suspended
canals (caleiras)
• Erosion of canal banks or rupture
of canal banks (due to ﬂoods or
created to accelerate water evacuation)
• Breaches in drainage canals
• Flooding of lower areas which
can take time to disappear due
to soil conditions and saturation
• Modiﬁcation of canal proﬁle
due to sand deposition and
siltation affecting water
distribution
• Alteration of plot levelling
• Sand deposition in drainage
systems affecting their
drainage capacity
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functioning had also limited the response capacity of the
manager. The internal maintenance unit was broken up and
the heavy equipment transferred to service providers that
the manager was supposed to contract for preventive, cura-
tive and emergency maintenance. The maintenance of the
secondary and tertiary infrastructure was supposed to be de-
veloped by newly created WUAs that brought farmers to-
gether around secondary canals. But HICEP never had the
ﬁnancial resources to contract the service providers. It could
only proceed with the manual cleaning of the main canals
and the drainage system was ignored. Many WUAs existed
only on paper and those that were operational concentrated
their efforts on support of crop production (for example, hir-
ing tractors for mechanized labour) rather than coordinating
local infrastructure operation and maintenance as required
by the newly established regulations. Their intervention ca-
pacity was in any case limited: they had no funding source,
while the size of some of the infrastructure and the amount
of sand deposited during ﬂooding require the mobilization
of heavy machinery. The other institutions such as the coor-
dinating platform for maintenance (Conselho Paritario de
Gestão) never really met after the departure of the French re-
habilitation team.
The ﬂood as a mediating event which attracted
increased donor attention
In 2008, the state authorized the creation of a maintenance
unit within HICEP and donated excavators and bulldozers.
In 2013 HICEP was able to proceed with some emergency
repairs immediately after the ﬂood, in order to avoid the loss
of some of the rice that had withstood submersion. HICEP
managed to get water back into the primary canal and to
recover a water service over 4000 ha only a month after
the ﬂood, a performance for which it was justiﬁably praised.
By comparison, it had taken 2 years to achieve the same
result in 2000 because the manager was obliged to subcon-
tract the work (see supplementary material Table 2 for the
evolution of the area cropped and/or harvested between
1998 and 2014).
The ﬂood also highlighted the importance of good main-
tenance of drainage canals for the urbanized areas,
highlighted by the role of drainage canal V. The displace-
ment of 50 000 people from the area due to the ﬂooding also
attracted media and government attention to the area. This
enabled an increase in the donation of equipment ﬁrst for
emergency work and then for more permanent maintenance
and the functioning of the maintenance unit, which
amounted to 18 machines including 5 excavators. Although
this remained far below the equipment level of the manager
before the reform (see supplementary material Table 1), the
maintenance unit is now steadily developing, which has im-
proved the maintenance of the drainage system.
Impact on the relationships between actors
A new dynamism centred on the HICEP mainte-
nance unit. The success of the emergency activities and
the increase in their maintenance capacity provided the
manager with a sense of agency, which along with other
factors such as government support created a new dynamism
in the maintenance strategy and reinforced its capacity for
action. The relationships between actors were also
reconﬁgurated by the ﬂood (see supplementary materials
Figure 1 and 2 for an illustration of this reconﬁguration).
The sharing of responsibilities between WUAs and HICEP
was renegotiated in parallel, and HICEP is now ofﬁcially
in charge of the maintenance of primary and secondary ca-
nals and the repairs of the suspended canals (tertiary) when
the latter break down. For their part, farmers agreed to a
50% increase in the water fee and the creation in 2014 of
an infrastructure fee currently only charged in the rehabili-
tated Rio sector. Finally, the Participatory Management
Councils (Conselhos Paritario de Gestão) were (re)activated
and meeting frequency increased from two to six a year.
Some confusion remained about the role and place of the
farmers associations2 in the scheme that existed before the
creation of WUAs.
Farmer initiatives for infrastructure maintenance.
Although WUAs had been created for maintenance pur-
poses, they were mostly perceived as instruments to capture
and allocate external support. They had little experience of
mobilization for collective action, except in one women’s
association which pre-existed WUA creation (UNAC
association). Immediately after the ﬂood, many farmers
organized themselves to repair the tertiary infrastructure
and irrigate where secondary canals were still functional.
Collective initiatives were mentioned in the three FGDs.
They included joining forces to repair fallen caleiras,
buying cement for repairs, collective cleaning of secondary
and tertiary canals to save the rice crops that survived
submersion and creating a collective nursery for horticul-
tural crops. Some individual innovative practices were also
observed, such as using plastic tubes to replace caleiras or
building earth canals. Some farmers or associations also
bought fuel to secure the intervention of HICEP heavy
equipment in their area.
However, the number of farmers involved in each initia-
tive as well as social pressure for mobilization appeared
limited. Except for the women’s association already men-
tioned, mobilization resulted more from the authority of
village leaders than association functioning. They were also
hampered by different limitations. Groups of women, who
form the majority of small-scale farmers, often lack the
strength to carry out repairs of heavy caleiras. The levelling
of caleiras is acknowledged by all actors to be a difﬁcult and
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technical task, and when inappropriately carried out can
result in signiﬁcant water loss, accentuating short- or
medium-term drainage and salinization issues. Moreover,
previous studies on the generalization of alternative designs
for caleiras had underlined the need to associate them with
pumping, which would increase operational and mainte-
nance costs. Many technicians were thus uncomfortable
with these initiatives. But the main limits remained the
money shortage that characterized the emergency phase
and the difﬁculties experienced in buying necessary mate-
rials. Farmers were unable to fund major repairs or clean
silted secondary or even tertiary drainage canals, all of
which require heavy machinery.
Increasing tensions due to transparency issues in
ﬂood-relief mechanisms for agriculture. Although
farmers in the area do not perceive ﬂooding as a problem
but rather an opportunity which increases soil fertility and
enables productive recession crops, relief aid was necessary
for many farmers in order to start the new agricultural cycle
as they had lost their food reserves and assets for their
livelihoods.
A large variety of organizations and institutions were
active in the district at this stage. Each of them had their
own geographic and/or social targets, philosophy and mode
of intervention (Table III). A majority of organizations
provided seeds or cuttings but there were limited options
Table III. Examples of different types of intervention in support of agricultural production in the recovery phase.
OXFAM Agriculture fair and voucher distribution
to targeted families
As one of the NGOs involved in post-ﬂood relief interventions
under the coordination of INGC, OXFAM was assigned the
district area of Chókwè. In the nine communities selected by the
NGO, it provided support for the rehabilitation of the domestic
water supply system and for agricultural production for food
security. A subsidy worth 2500 MT in the form of voucher to
spend at an agriculture fair organized by the NGO was provided
to the target population (4490 families) using a well-deﬁned
methodology to select the families. Recipients could choose to
buy a wide range of different (agricultural) inputs (seeds, small
equipment, fertilizers, etc). The seed quality was assessed to be of
a high standard. The whole process was assessed afterwards.
CPLa Allocation of a beneﬁcial credit
advantageous to a limited number of
farmers
The GoM gave 19 800 000 MT to HICEP to fund an
advantageous credit line (10% interest rate instead of the usual
36%, 6-month non-payment period, 1-year delay to repay,
applicable to any type of crop) for the new agriculture cycle in
the scheme. HICEP contracted the management of this fund to
the credit organization it controlled (CPL).
The selection of recipients was unclear: half of the recipients
were supposed to be big farmers so that the credit could serve to
increase food supply availability in markets. The other half
targeted small and medium-sized farmers. Leaders’ associations
were asked to provide a list of names with the requested amounts.
The aggregated demand was 15 times the available amount and
HICEP and CPL made a second selection, involving 250 farmers
in total (4 or 5 persons per association). The limited number of
beneﬁciaries and the lack of transparency in the selection process
caused a great deal of frustration.
SDAEb Recovery kit distribution in all villages The agriculture extension services distributed seeds (cabbage,
maize, peas, onion, lettuce and tomato) and small equipment on
behalf of the government and international agencies (FAO). The
recipients were associations and various villages. Distribution
followed traditional administrative mechanisms: allocation by
administrative post, then localities and ﬁnally villages. Elected
leaders were in charge of the distribution at village level. The
farmers had no choice of seeds and received a limited quantity (if
any at all) as there was a large deﬁcit compared to the demand for
maize, onions and tomatoes. Some associations were forgotten in
the distribution list. The seed quality was assessed as poor.
Sources: Field interviews; Simpson et al., (2013).
aPortuguese acronym for Saving and Credit Cooperative of the Limpopo Producers—credit organization linked to HICEP.
bPortuguese acronym for District Services of Agriculture and Economic Affairs which gathers together government extension services at district level.
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for credit or agricultural inputs. Many farmers complained
of the difﬁculty of getting information on the different
options and of gaining access to a scheme. They were partic-
ularly critical of the limited number of packages made
available at each village level, the quantity available per
family as well as the seed quality of the government pack-
ages. The lack of transparency of many of the distribution
schemes was a recurrent complaint of all discussions and in-
terviews. The frustration was particularly acute concerning
the allocation of the credit line for irrigation due to the very
limited number of people concerned and the expectations
raised during the identiﬁcation phase.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The new dynamism of the maintenance unit addressing
the drainage issue in the scheme
At policy level, irrigation schemes in ﬂood plains are of-
ten considered only as investment to control water for ag-
ricultural intensiﬁcation. Consequently ﬂoods are
considered as externalities and not part of the system.
Focusing on economic efﬁciency and reduction of state
involvement (and spending), the IMT policy reform lim-
ited the capacity for action of the scheme manager to react
to emergency situations. The 2013 ﬂood event highlighted
the role of the scheme’s drainage systems, especially
important in densely populated areas (Ladki et al., 2006)
but which are generally disregarded at policy level
(Abdeldayem et al., 2005; Ritzema et al., 2007) . The in-
tensiﬁcation of agriculture enabled by irrigation is accom-
panied by the development of various economic activities
around input supply or value chains, which make these
areas attractive for the population. Thanks to the recent ef-
fort to better mainstream climate change adaptation into
development assistance (Sietz et al., 2011), ﬂoods in the
Limpopo Basin are now widely acknowledged as the
norms and not the exception. In this context, the capacity
of the scheme manager to address a ﬂood crisis as well as
regular maintenance of the drainage system is thus not
only a food production necessity but also contributes to
population safety and well-being. This is all the more im-
portant as traditional prevention solutions involve many
limitations, as underlined by the 2013 ﬂood: both the
Massingir Dam and the dyke system that were supposed
to protect the city faced maintenance issues and the reallo-
cation strategy failed due to issues of cost and accessibil-
ity (Artur and Hilhorst, 2012).
The 2013 ﬂood was thus an opportunity for the manager
to learn and improve the management process. The ability
to recover irrigation for 50% of the surface cultivated before
the ﬂood in less than 2 months led to the remobilization of
technicians and agents. The ﬂood was also instrumental in
redynamizing HICEP’s maintenance strategy. It not only
helped redeﬁne and validate HICEP’s responsibility for the
irrigation canals by the state but also helped to channel
funding for the reinforcement of the manager’s maintenance
unit and rehabilitation of the dykes. The (re)allocation of
heavy machinery enabled work to start on cleaning the
scheme’s drainage system, which had been neglected over
the previous 15 years.
But the capacity for response and action goes beyond the
development of a sense of agency and presupposes certain
levels of skills, equipment and budget. It also presupposes
the capacity to make suitable decisions, which is related to
access to information and learning from previous experi-
ence, as well as coordination of the various actions and
reactions of the actors.
Strengthening the availability of information to better
manage ﬂood situations
The question of the ﬂood safety of hydraulic infrastructure
has been raised mainly in regard to dykes, dam manage-
ment and more recently urban drainage systems (Vis
et al., 2003; Berry et al., 2013). At international level there
is still little investigation of how to manage complex water
conveyance networks in the case of ﬂood events. The ﬂood
map was a way to quickly collect and synthesize different
expertise and local knowledge and them in a single digita-
lized document. The confrontation of multiple local knowl-
edges partially balances the risk of inaccuracy due to
mobilization of representations. The ﬁnal map was used
by HICEP in at least one meeting with donors to present
synthesized information about the ﬂood and highlight
post-ﬂood activities.
It was also a ﬁrst step towards building the institutional
memory necessary to improve response procedures (Harris
and Bahadur, 2011; Throness, 2013) which is poor inmany lo-
cal institutions, due to high staff rotation and the limited avail-
ability of up-to-date technical information—such as accurate
maps (Kuijpers et al., 2013). In particular, it was impossible
to ﬁnd spatialized information concerning the impact of the
2000 ﬂood on the scheme: comparing the 2000 and 2013 ﬂood
events could potentially help identify fragile sections of the in-
frastructure that should receive speciﬁc attention, and thus pro-
pose and discuss technical amelioration. The map could also
be valuable in identifying the most important drainage issues
in the scheme, by comparing this knowledge-based map with
the post-ﬂood map provided by satellite image analysis
(UNITAR/UNOSAT, 2013, https://unosat-maps.web.cern.ch/
unosat-maps/MZ/FL2013000018MOZ/UNOSAT_A3_RS_
FL20130121MOZ_ChokweFlood_4Feb.pdf).
A second step could be to add a sheet for each emergency
activity, summarizing the type of intervention, the resources
mobilized (equipment, workforce, money), the duration
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of the work and the difﬁculties encountered. This would
provide useful information for further ﬂood contingency
planning. The cost–beneﬁt analysis of the rehabilitation
design option could also be complemented by the invest-
ment cost of the various design options of the tertiary
systems, including those developed in private areas, as well
as their maintenance and repair costs, but also their potential
impact on long-term drainage and salinization. This is
typical research development work that could be undertaken
in collaboration with local universities.
Strengthening collective capacity for action
In farmer-managed irrigation systems in Nepal, the major
disturbances were not so much those affecting the physical
part of the system such as ﬂoods or landslides, but the
changes in user-group composition, or those affecting the
institutional structure (Ternström, 2005). This tends to
indicate that social and collective relationships play a more
important role in the adaptive capacity of hydraulic systems
than technical aspects.
Social learning activities are being promoted as a way to
develop adaptive and collective action by enhancing indi-
vidual capacity and collective learning as well as facilitating
group coherence and dynamism (Maurel et al., 2007; Reed
et al., 2010). The mapping exercise, a typical social learning
activity, was an opportunity for all the local technical staff
of the irrigation sectors to collectively discuss the event,
its causes and the actions taken and to analyse their conse-
quences while trying to organize the spatial coherence of
these impacts at sector and then scheme level. It contributed
to the capacity building of lower-level staff in map reading
and spatial analysis, which can be useful in maintenance
planning. They were also encouraged to present their
perspectives, which they had limited opportunity to do in
the prevailing hierarchical setting of HICEP. Such social
learning activities can help the different actors rethink their
task and responsibilities. However, the exercise did not
mobilize farmers, although in fact such an exercise could
have been valuable for reinforcement of the participatory
maintenance platforms, which at the time were inoperative.
HICEP acknowledges that the real engagement of farmers is
necessary for long-term sustainability of the scheme, not only
through the payment of the water fee but also via regular main-
tenance of the tertiary level. In the scheme, collective actions
and initiatives around maintenance are limited. Most associa-
tions focus on agricultural support and have limited effective
action in terms of maintenance and water distribution. The
ﬂood crisis proved to be a key moment where collective ac-
tions developed spontaneously which could be used to im-
prove WUA capacity and involvement in the functioning of
the scheme. This should involve activities in the form of
training and the accompaniment of farmers both during the
regular maintenance of the tertiary canals and emergency
repairs.
The renewed central focus on maintenance was
complemented by the new attention paid to the formalized
relationships between the managers and farmers’ associa-
tions and a review of the formal maintenance institutions.
These improved communications between the manager
and the leaders of WUAs. But the impact on collective ac-
tion was limited for two reasons: in practice there appears
to be tension between a willingness to encourage greater
farmer involvement and the entrenched attitudes of com-
mand and control. Furthermore, a lack of transparency
and confusion in the distribution of agricultural support
during the recovery phase have increased mistrust between
small-scale farmers and the decision-level layer made up of
association leaders and technicians, which is perceived as
favouring only some farmers. This could jeopardize collec-
tive engagement and directly affects the maintenance of in-
frastructure as underlined in the recent case of borehole
maintenance in an upstream district (Ducrot, 2017). Im-
proving communication and farmers’ participation in main-
tenance planning could be a starting point in improving
trust between actors, provided technicians take care to in-
clude small-scale farmers’ perspectives better in the
process.
Recurrent ﬂooding—and poor maintenance—had directly
impacted the productivity of crop system in the Chókwè
Irrigation Scheme. The new dynamism in addressing the
drainage issue—combining both technical and social
aspects—is an opportunity to break the vicious circle into
which the Chókwè Irrigation Scheme has been locked over
the last 40 years.
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NOTES
1 Mild or moderate ﬂood corresponds to a water level in the
Limpopo River of 4–8 m in Chókwè, while a severe ﬂood
is above 8 m.
2 These associations are members of UNAC (National
Union of Small Scale Irrigators), while WUAs are
grouped in UNAR (National Union of Irrigators).
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